主 题：Job Matching with Subsidy and Taxation
主讲人：孙宁 南京审计大学 教授 博导
时 间：2020年11月21日（星期六）上午9:30-11:00
地 点：商学院124报告厅
摘要：
Governments often provide employers with financial incentives which depend on the sets of people they hire. This paper studies such fiscal policies (subsidy and taxation) in a Kelso-Crawford job matching framework, and characterizes which transfer functions preserve the substitutes condition (for all revenue functions that satisfies the condition), a condition crucial for guaranteeing the existence and other regularities of competitive equilibria. We find that a transfer function preserves the substitute condition if and only if it can be written as a sum of an additively separable transfer function and a cardinally concave transfer function. Then we characterize transfer functions that preserve the substitutes condition for revenue functions which are, respectively, group separable, group concave, cardinally concave, etc. The vectorial substitutes condition, a generalization of the substitutes condition, is also studied.
主讲人简介：
孙宁，经济学博士，教授，南京审计大学社会与经济研究院院长。主要研究领域为微观经济理论、市场机制设计。在Econometrica、AER、JPE等国际一流经济学期刊上发表了10多篇学术论文。2009年获教育部高等学校科学研究优秀成果奖（人文社会科学）二等奖，2013年入选新世纪百千万人才工程国家级人选。
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